Abstract : Coherent one photon pulses are sent with four possible time delays with respect to a reference. Ambiguity of the photon time detection resulting from pulses overlap combined with interferometnc measurement allows for secure key exchange.
The information is coded on coherent one photon pulses with a square profile, a duration T and a chosen delay with respect to a time reference. The delays are chosen by Alice so that possible pulse s may overlap. Bob can perform only one time measurement which may lead to an ambiguity on the delay evaluation. Bob sends at random half of the pulses he receives to an unbalanced Mach -Zender interferometer (propagation time difference TI2 and phase diffe rence of K) ( Fig. 1 ) to ensure that he actually receives pulses of duration T [l] . The other arm of the input beamsplitter is sent to the photon counter which is used to establish the key between Alice and Bob ( Fig. 1) .
. The protocol is modeled with a one photon states li) basis corresponding to successive pulses of duration Tt2. The states used in the protocols are of the form I i , i + 1) = l/& 4 i ) + I i + 1)). In the two states protocol [ 11, Eve can exploit the channel losses to eavesdrop the key. To overcome that limitation, we propose a protocol based on 4 states. Alice sends at random, with equal probabilities, states 11,2), I2,3), 13,4), 14,s) (delays 0, Tl2, T, 3Tl2 respectively). The information is coded on states )2,3) and 13,4) (eg bit 0 and 1). Detection in time slot 3 do not allow to distinguish between bits 0 and 1 . The main difference with the two states protocol is that the useful time slots 2 and 4 are ambiguous during the transmission of the raw key due to the possible emission of states I1,2) and I4,5) by Alice. When Eve measures the pulse position, she has to resend a pulse of duration T, in the ideal case, to avoid a drop of the contrast at Bob interferometer. She then unavoidabl y induces errors that Alice and Bob can detect comparing publicly part of the raw key and measuring the QBER. After the transmission of the raw key, Alice reveals to Bob each time she has sent states I1,2) or states 143) and discard the corresponding measuremen ts. The detection in time slots 2 or 4 becomes non ambiguous to Bob. He then reveals to Alice when this has occurred without revealing the result and discards the ambiguous measurements i n time slot 3. A secret key can thus be exchanged between Alice and B ob.
The state that can be resent by Eve can be evaluated as a function of the losses and decoherence induced by the transmission, leading to the maximum allowed probability for Eve to intercept the pulse without being detected. Finally one can calculate the information obtained on Alice by Eve (IAE) and Bob (I-) respectively 121, as a function of the QBER (Fig. 2) 
